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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
D.E., now 23 years of age, was a minor diagnosed with 
a learning disability and enrolled in school in the Central 
Dauphin School District ("Central Dauphin").  D.E.'s parents, 
Maria English and Ronald Sheffy, claimed that while D.E. 
was enrolled in Central Dauphin he was deprived of a free 
appropriate public education ("FAPE"), in violation of the 
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
1
 ("IDEA"), and 
that he was discriminated against based upon his various 
disabilities, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities 
Act
2
 ("ADA") and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
3
 ("RA").  
The District Court dismissed D.E.'s IDEA claims, and later 
granted summary judgment in Central Dauphin's favor as to 
the ADA and RA claims.  For the reasons set forth below, we 
will affirm in part and reverse in part.    
I. 
A. 
                                              
1
 20 U.S.C. § 1400, et seq. 
2
 42 U.S.C. § 12132. 
3
 29 U.S.C. § 794. 
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D.E. attended school in Central Dauphin from 
kindergarten to the seventh grade.
4
  Prior to his entrance into 
the school district, D.E. was enrolled in preschool at the 
Capital Area Intermediate Unit ("CAIU").  There, D.E.'s 
parents completed an early intervention referral form for 
purposes of a speech/language evaluation.  On that form, they 
indicated that D.E. had "attentional concerns."  After 
undergoing several evaluations, CAIU determined that D.E. 
was eligible for early intervention services and placed D.E. in 
speech and language therapy.   
When D.E. began his transition into Central Dauphin 
in June 1995, his school file indicated that he was entering the 
school district with an individualized education program 
("IEP") to address his speech and language issues.  In spite of 
that, D.E. was not placed in any specialized courses.  Three 
months later, D.E.'s mother signed a form permitting the 
school district to evaluate D.E.  Seven months after receiving 
permission, Central Dauphin conducted the evaluation.  The 
only test conducted at that time was for speech and language 
therapy.  The resulting comprehensive evaluation report 
("CER") and subsequent IEP thus contained only speech and 
language goals.  The CER described D.E. as a pleasant, 
friendly, outgoing child who got along well with other 
children and appeared to have self confidence.  His report 
card for that school year, however, indicated that he was 
having considerable difficulty academically.  By the end of 
                                              
4
 According to D.E. and his family, Central Dauphin's 
alleged statutory violations occurred throughout the entirety 
of his tenure with the school.  Because neither party appears 
to dispute the facts found in the hearing officer's decision, the 
following facts are drawn largely from that decision. 
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his kindergarten year, he had not acquired the skills necessary 
to move on to the first grade and had to repeat his 
kindergarten year.   
Within one month of the start of D.E.'s repeat 
kindergarten year, in approximately September of 1996, his 
mother initiated a request for another evaluation.  The CER 
was completed on December 13, 1996, and identified D.E. as 
having a learning disability and as in need of specially 
designed instruction.  That CER did not include 
recommendations for learning support services or address the 
"attentional concerns" raised by D.E.'s parents or any other 
impairments.  D.E. was then placed in a learning support 
resource room where he received speech and language 
therapy.  His new IEP was completed on December 17, 1996 
and contained learning support goals and objectives, as well 
as recommendations for speech and language services.  D.E.'s 
parents approved of these recommendations.  Despite the 
changes in placement and services, D.E.'s teacher indicated at 
the end of his repeat year in kindergarten that he was still not 
performing academically at grade-level.   
D.E. started his first-grade year at Central Dauphin in 
the Fall of 1997.  At that time, his IEP was modified to 
recommend that he be placed in a full-time learning support 
room, which his parents approved.  Following that change, 
however, D.E.'s behavior became more erratic.  His parents, 
concerned by this change in behavior, obtained both wrap-
around services and therapeutic support staff ("TSS") to 
attend school with him.  D.E.'s parents continued to have 
concerns and, in April 1998, had D.E. evaluated by an 
external medical provider, Pinnacle Health Services 
("Pinnacle").  Pinnacle diagnosed D.E. as having borderline 
retardation, extreme difficulties with visual and motor skills, 
and bi-polar disorder.  Pinnacle administered the Wechsler 
 6 
Intelligence Scale for Children ("WISC"), which measures a 
child's general cognitive abilities, and ultimately 
recommended that D.E.'s cognitive performance be closely 
monitored and re-evaluated by Central Dauphin within the 
next year.   
Central Dauphin did not reevaluate D.E. for cognitive 
ability, as Pinnacle had recommended, but did administer an 
additional Wechsler Independent Achievement Test 
("WIAT"), which provides a comprehensive measure of a 
student's basic scholastic skills.  That evaluation report 
included results from the WIAT scale and Pinnacle's WISC 
results.  During that evaluation, Central Dauphin also 
determined that D.E. needed emotional support services.     
D.E. entered the second grade in 1998 in a full-time 
learning and emotional support program.  During the school 
year, D.E.'s second grade teacher expressed concern about 
whether D.E.'s TSS was necessary.  The TSS was later 
discontinued.  At some point during his second grade year, 
D.E. began regressing behaviorally.  As a result, D.E.'s 
mother requested an additional evaluation.  The re-evaluation 
was completed by D.E.'s teacher, who expressed concerns 
about D.E.'s academic goals and placement.  D.E.'s 
behavioral issues increased and he was eventually diagnosed 
with depression.  Central Dauphin did not provide D.E. with a 
behavior support program or conduct an additional 
assessment.     
D.E.'s IEP was modified again in third grade to read 
"seriously emotionally disturbed," a classification usually 
associated with mental retardation.  As a result, D.E. was 
placed in a Life Skills Support program, which focused on 
providing additional support geared towards children with a 
diagnosis of mental retardation.  He was later mistakenly 
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identified as having mental retardation.  No adaptive behavior 
assessment was completed.  D.E. remained in the Life Skills 
Support Program throughout the third and fourth grades.  
When D.E.'s mother realized D.E. was identified as mentally 
retarded, she filed a complaint and withdrew D.E. from the 
program.  In response, Central Dauphin apologized to D.E.'s 
parents, found the designation error, fixed it, and advised 
D.E.'s mother of the change.  Later that year, D.E. was also 
inaccurately found to be ineligible for other extended school 
year services.   
 8 
In 2001, D.E.'s IEP was changed to recommend that he 
participate in regular education courses for his fifth-grade 
year, with an emphasis on his specific learning disability.  
The very next year, however, D.E.'s goals and the specially 
designed instruction regarding his behavior and social issues 
were dropped from the IEP without explanation.  To further 
compound that error, D.E. was again found ineligible for 
extended school year services.   
D.E.'s seventh grade IEP goal was to increase his math 
skills to a fourth-grade level.  However, D.E.'s seventh-grade 
teacher was not trained in any research-based math 
instruction and she did not maintain any records 
demonstrating D.E.'s progress on the IEP goal.  During that 
same year, the team responsible for overseeing D.E.'s IEP 
delayed the process while awaiting a new evaluation report.  
That delay resulted in D.E. working under an expired IEP for 
three months.  The new CER, once received, failed to assess 
in detail D.E.'s emotional and behavioral needs.  In addition, 
although the new CER identified issues with D.E.'s social 
skills, the resulting IEP never addressed that area, and Central 
Dauphin never conducted any follow-up in the form of 
classroom observations or curriculum-based assessments.      
Beginning in eighth grade, Central Dauphin convened 
a meeting with D.E.'s parents where they reviewed the 
previous IEP and an evaluation report.  D.E. moved from 
Central Dauphin shortly thereafter.  Following the move, 
D.E.'s parents requested a due process hearing with Central 
Dauphin to determine whether D.E. had been provided a 
FAPE during his time in Central Dauphin.    
B. 
 The administrative hearing was held in January and 
February of 2006 before an impartial hearing officer.  At the 
 9 
conclusion of that hearing, the hearing officer found that 
Central Dauphin had violated both the IDEA and the RA 
during D.E.'s time with the school district.  The hearing 
officer further concluded that D.E. had been denied a FAPE 
for all eight years while at Central Dauphin and that Central 
Dauphin knew D.E. had more needs than those answered by 
speech and language therapy upon his entry into the school 
district for his first year of kindergarten.   
 In an order dated March 23, 2006, the hearing officer 
awarded D.E. compensatory education in the amount of "one 
hour for each hour of each school day for each year he 
attended [Central Dauphin and] . . . fifteen hours for each of 
six weeks for missed summer programs for the years from 
2000 to 2004."  App. at 171.  The award went on to note that 
D.E.'s parents "may decide how the hours should be spent," 
with some limitations, and that reimbursement for the 
services would be "at the rate that the parent is obligated to 
pay, [and] not [at] a district determined rate."  Id.  Finally, the 
award noted that "[s]hould the parties agree, [Central 
Dauphin] may set up a fund with a set dollar amount that the 
parent may draw upon for educational services and 
equipment."  Id.  Neither party appealed the hearing officer's 
order. 
On December 18, 2006, D.E. and his parents brought 
an action before the District Court against Central Dauphin 
seeking to recover a monetary equivalent of the nearly 10,000 
hours of compensatory education awarded to D.E. in the 
hearing officer's March 2006 order.  D.E. and his parents also 
sought compensatory damages under the ADA, IDEA, and § 
504 of the RA.  In an order dated March 31, 2009, following 
Central Dauphin's motion for judgment on the pleadings, the 
District Court dismissed D.E.'s IDEA claims, citing D.E.'s 
failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the fact that there 
 10 
existed no evidence that the hearing officer's order required 
enforcement, and due to the unavailability of damages.  The 
District Court then denied Central Dauphin's motion 
regarding D.E.'s ADA and RA claims, noting that actions 
brought pursuant to those statutes did not require 
administrative exhaustion and that compensatory damages 
were available for those claims. 
 Thereafter, Central Dauphin filed a motion for 
summary judgment as to D.E.'s ADA and RA claims.  The 
District Court granted the motion on January 3, 2013 after 
finding no evidence that Central Dauphin had intentionally 
discriminated against D.E.  D.E. now appeals the District 
Court's 2009 order dismissing his IDEA claim for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies, as well as its conclusion that 
no evidence existed that the hearing officer's order required 
enforcement,
 5
 and its 2013 order granting Central Dauphin's 
motion for summary judgment on his ADA and RA claims.    
II. 
 We note, at the outset, that a question of appellate 
jurisdiction potentially blocks our consideration of this 
appeal.  We will, therefore, pause for a moment to determine 
our jurisdiction.  See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628 
(2002) ("It is familiar law that a federal court always has 
jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.").   
 On March 14, 2013, the Clerk's Office issued an 
Amended Order addressing, among other things, D.E.'s 
ability to pursue the instant appeal on his own behalf.  The 
Order stated:  
                                              
5
 D.E. has not reasserted on appeal his claim for 
compensatory damages under the IDEA. 
 11 
It is noted that Appellant 
D.E. is now more than twenty-one 
(21) years old.  Given this, the 
parties must, within seven (7) 
days of the date of this Order, 
advise the Court, in writing, 
whether D.E. is capable of 
prosecuting his own claims. . . .  
In addition, if D.E. is 
pursuing the appeal in his own 
behalf, he must personally sign 
the notice of appeal filed by his 
mother, Maria English, and return 
it to the Clerk's Office within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of 
this Order.  Failure to do so will 
result in dismissal of the appeal as 
to D.E. 
 
App. at 268 (citations omitted).  The Court of Appeals docket 
indicates that D.E.'s signed Notice of Appeal was received on 
April 1, 2013, more than fifteen days later.    
  Central Dauphin urges this Court to dismiss D.E.'s 
appeal because his signed Notice of Appeal was not received 
within the 14-day timeframe designated by the Order.  D.E., 
by contrast, argues that an appellant's failure to sign a notice 
of appeal is curable and should not result in dismissal so long 
as that failure is promptly corrected, as he argues he has done 
here.  He directs our attention to Becker v. Montgomery, 532 
U.S. 757, 760 (2001), a Supreme Court decision cited within 
the Amended Order and which he claims supports his 
position.  D.E. is correct.   
 12 
It is well established "that decisions on the merits 
[should] not . . . be avoided on grounds of technical violations 
of procedural rules."  Polonski v. Trump Taj Mahal Assocs., 
137 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 1998) (discussing Rule 3(c) of the 
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure); see also Drinkwater v. 
Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 858 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(noting that notices of appeal are to be construed liberally).  
Here, D.E. failed to sign and return the notice of appeal 
within fourteen days of the date of the Order.  D.E.'s failure 
was cured, however, upon receipt by the Clerk's Office of the 
signed notice approximately four days later on April 1, 2013.  
The Supreme Court has made clear that an appellant's failure 
to sign a timely notice of appeal can be cured after the 
deadline to file the notice, as such a failure is curable and not 
a jurisdictional impediment.  See Becker, 532 U.S. at 765-66.  
Because the signature requirement was curable, and D.E. did 
indeed cure the defect shortly after the deadline, our 
jurisprudence counsels in favor of exercising appellate 
jurisdiction over D.E.'s appeal.  We therefore conclude that 
we have jurisdiction to review the merits of the instant appeal.
 
6
   
III. 
A. 
                                              
6
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
1291.     
 13 
 D.E. first challenges the District Court's grant of 
summary judgment on his ADA and RA claims.
7
  "We review 
a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, 
applying the same standard as the district court."  S.H. v. 
Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 729 F.3d 248, 257 (3d Cir. 2013).  
Summary judgment is appropriate only where "the moving 
party has established 'that there is no genuine dispute as to 
any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a 
matter of law.'"  Id. at 256 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)).  In 
reviewing a motion for summary judgment, all facts should 
be viewed "in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party" and "all reasonable inferences [should be drawn] in 
that party's favor."  Scheidemantle v. Slippery Rock Univ. 
State Sys. of Higher Educ., 470 F.3d 535, 538 (3d Cir. 2006).  
We note, too, that in applying this standard, the non-moving 
                                              
7
 Central Dauphin argues that all of D.E.'s arguments 
raised on appeal regarding his ADA and RA claims were not 
properly preserved before the District Court.  We will reject 
this argument.  "For an issue to be preserved for appeal, a 
party must unequivocally put its position before the trial court 
at a point and in a manner that permits the court to consider 
its merits."  In re Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 
241, 262 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Shell Petroleum, Inc. v. 
United States, 182 F.3d 212, 218 (3d Cir. 1999)) (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  D.E. presented his ADA and RA 
arguments, including the element of intentional 
discrimination, a number of times before the District Court.  
See, e.g., Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment, D.E. v. Central Dauphin Sch. 
Dist., No. 1:06-cv-02423-LFS, (M.D. Pa. Jan. 27, 2012), ECF 
No. 90.  His ADA and RA arguments were properly 
preserved. 
 14 
party must overcome his own hurdle in order to withstand the 
motion for summary judgment.  See Gans v. Mundy, 762 F.2d 
338, 341 (3d Cir. 1985).  The non-moving party must oppose 
the motion and, in doing so, "may not rest upon the mere 
allegations or denials of his pleadings."  Id.  "[H]is response . 
. . must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine 
issue for trial."  Id.  "[B]are assertions, conclusory 
allegations[,] or suspicions" will not suffice.  Id.      
To establish claims under § 504 of the RA and the 
ADA,
8
 a plaintiff must demonstrate that: (1) he has a 
disability, or was regarded as having a disability; (2) he was 
"otherwise qualified" to participate in school activities; and 
(3) he was "denied the benefits of the program or was 
otherwise subject to discrimination because of [his] 
disability."  Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 
587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009).  Where, as in the instant 
case, a plaintiff seeks compensatory damages as a remedy for 
violations of the RA and the ADA, it is not enough to 
demonstrate only that the plaintiff has made out the prima 
facie case outlined above.  S.H., 729 F.3d at 261.  He or she 
must also demonstrate that the aforementioned discrimination 
                                              
8
 The same standards govern both the RA and the 
ADA claims.  Chambers v. Sch. Dist. of Phila. Bd. of Educ., 
587 F.3d 176, 189 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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was intentional.  Id.  A showing of deliberate indifference 
satisfies that standard.  Id. at 263.
9
   
To satisfy the deliberate indifference standard, a 
plaintiff "must present evidence that shows both: (1) 
knowledge that a federally protected right is substantially 
likely to be violated . . . , and (2) failure to act despite that 
knowledge."  Id. at 265 (citing Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 
F.3d 1124, 1139 (9th Cir. 2001)).  "Deliberate indifference 
does not require a showing of personal ill will or animosity 
toward the disabled person."  Id. at 263 (quoting Meagley v. 
City of Little Rock, 639 F.3d 384, 389 (8th Cir. 2011) 
(internal quotation marks omitted)).  It does, however, require 
a "'deliberate choice, rather than negligence or bureaucratic 
inaction.'"  Id. (quoting Loeffler v. Staten Island Univ. Hosp., 
582 F.3d 268, 276 (2d Cir. 2009)). 
D.E. argues that he has demonstrated that Central 
Dauphin acted with deliberate indifference to his federally 
protected right to a FAPE.  He relies heavily upon the hearing 
                                              
9
 As an initial matter, the parties dispute whether D.E. 
has established a prima facie case under the RA and the 
ADA.  The sole point of contention in that regard concerns 
the first element, that is, whether D.E. has adequately 
demonstrated that he is disabled.  To the extent that D.E. 
seeks only compensatory damages, the relevance of this issue 
solely depends upon the outcome of our inquiry into the 
question of intentional discrimination.  Because we ultimately 
conclude that D.E. has not demonstrated that there exists a 
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Central 
Dauphin acted with deliberate indifference, we need not 
belabor our analysis with an inquiry into whether D.E. has 
established this element of a prima facie case under the RA 
and the ADA.   
 16 
officer's findings of fact in this regard, citing to various points 
in the administrative record which, in his opinion, 
demonstrate that Central Dauphin knew that it was violating 
his rights.  D.E. directs our attention to the following findings 
made by the hearing officer: (1) Central Dauphin's placement 
of D.E. into restrictive learning environments during his first 
and second grade years following certain evaluations that he 
considered to be lacking, as well as his subsequent 
misclassifications and misdiagnoses; (2) the failure of his 
IEPs to address ADHD concerns and his language-based 
learning disabilities; (3) Central Dauphin's placement of D.E. 
into a regular kindergarten classroom without an IEP and the 
seven-month delay in his first evaluation following his 
mother's request; (4) Central Dauphin's incorrect designation 
of D.E. as "ineligible" for extended school year services; and 
(5) Central Dauphin's failure to respond to concerns raised by 
his second and fourth grade teachers regarding his classroom 
placement and classification.  These findings do not point to 
deliberate indifference. 
To begin, the findings relied upon by D.E. largely 
relate to errors with the implementation of his IEP and certain 
classifications assigned to him following his evaluations.  
Without more, these errors fail to demonstrate that Central 
Dauphin knew that it was misclassifying and/or 
misdiagnosing D.E.  We have stated this point before: "The 
relevant inquiry is knowledge, and evidence that the School 
District may have been wrong about [a student's] diagnosis is 
not evidence that the School District had knowledge that it 
was a wrong diagnosis.  Nor does evidence that the School 
District's evaluation processes were defective bear on our 
analysis."  S.H., 729 F.3d at 266.  D.E. appears to suggest in 
his brief that Central Dauphin ignored the evaluation and 
recommendations conducted by Pinnacle in 1998; however, 
 17 
in the same breath, he concedes that Central Dauphin relied 
upon the Pinnacle findings in order to misclassify D.E.  D.E.'s 
argument in this regard fails to acknowledge the fact that, 
although Central Dauphin did not conduct the exact tests 
recommended by Pinnacle, it did indeed administer additional 
testing – the WIAT – the results of which it incorporated with 
Pinnacle's test results into the new CER.  D.E.'s arguments 
demonstrate, at best, possible defective evaluation processes, 
which, of course, have no bearing on the question of 
knowledge. 
Similarly unavailing are the points raised by D.E. 
regarding Central Dauphin's incorrect designation regarding 
extended school year services and the delayed evaluation 
during his first year in the district.  Both allegations are 
premised upon what Central Dauphin should have known 
rather than what it actually knew.  Id. at 266 n.26 ("Deliberate 
indifference requires actual knowledge; allegations that one 
would have or 'should have known' will not satisfy the 
knowledge prong of deliberate indifference.").  There is 
nothing to suggest, in either instance, that Central Dauphin's 
actions constituted anything more than negligence or poor 
decision-making.  Id. at 263 (deliberate indifference requires 
a "deliberate choice, rather than negligence or bureaucratic 
inaction" (quoting Loeffler, 582 F.3d at 276) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).   
The strongest argument D.E. makes with respect to 
knowledge are the concerns raised by a few of his teachers 
regarding his performance and placement.  But even that 
argument is flawed, as there are several instances in the 
record in which D.E.'s parents approved of his IEPs and 
subsequent placements, including his placement in full-time 
learning support.  By contrast, the record reveals only one 
instance in which D.E.'s parents disapproved of his placement 
 18 
and classification – when Central Dauphin incorrectly 
identified D.E. as mentally retarded.  However, even if we 
were to proceed to the second prong of the deliberate 
indifference test on that point alone, we would have no basis 
to conclude that Central Dauphin failed to act on this 
knowledge, because Central Dauphin immediately issued an 
apology to D.E.'s parents, found the designation error, fixed 
it, and advised D.E.'s mother of the change.   
The fact of the matter is that each year D.E. was 
enrolled in the school district, Central Dauphin provided D.E. 
with special education and other related services through the 
completion and implementation of CERs and IEPs.  While the 
points raised by D.E. are most certainly unfortunate, we 
cannot agree that those findings are sufficient to withstand a 
motion for summary judgment on the question of deliberate 
indifference, particularly as to Central Dauphin's knowledge.  
For these reasons, we must affirm the District Court's grant of 
 19 
summary judgment in favor of Central Dauphin as to D.E.'s 
ADA and RA claims.
10
    
B. 
D.E.'s second argument challenges the District Court's 
dismissal of his IDEA claims for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies and due to its conclusion that no 
evidence existed that the hearing officer's order required 
enforcement.  Our review of a Rule 12(c) motion to dismiss is 
                                              
10
 In his brief, D.E. relied heavily on a non-
precedential opinion from our Court – Chambers v. School 
District of Philadelphia Board of Education, 537 F. App'x 90 
(3d Cir. 2013) – to support his position that there was a 
genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether Central 
Dauphin was deliberately indifferent.  We reject D.E.'s 
reliance on that opinion.  Aside from the fact that it is non-
binding on our Court, the facts of that case differ significantly 
from this one.  The school district in Chambers had been 
informed of the student's needs at various points and was 
ordered to provide certain services, but failed to follow 
through on those orders.  Id. at 96.  There was also evidence 
in the record that the school district caused certain delays and 
failures in the student's educational therapy resulting from the 
school district's outright refusal to guarantee payment for the 
services.  Id.  And finally, among other things, the school 
district caused extended delays in response to requests by the 
plaintiffs for hearings regarding these failures.  Id.  We 
acknowledge that there is certainly a fine line between 
mistakes and deliberate indifference, and we could even go so 
far as to call this case a "close call" (as we did in Chambers), 
but the facts of D.E.'s case are simply not egregious enough 
to satisfy us that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to 
whether Central Dauphin was deliberately indifferent.   
 20 
plenary.  Mele v. Fed. Reserve Bank of N.Y., 359 F.3d 251, 
253 (3d Cir. 2004).  We "view[] the facts alleged in the 
pleadings and the inferences to be drawn from those facts in 
the light most favorable to the plaintiff."  Id. (quoting Leamer 
v. Fauver, 288 F.3d 532, 535 (3d Cir. 2002) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)).  A Rule 12(c) motion "should not 
be granted unless the moving party has established that there 
is no material issue of fact to resolve, and that it is entitled to 
judgment in its favor as a matter of law."  Id. (internal 
quotation mark omitted).  
D.E. specifically argues that, at the time he filed his 
lawsuit, the administrative process in Pennsylvania only 
allowed appeals in circumstances where a party objected to 
the hearing officer's decision.  Because he prevailed at his 
hearing and was ultimately awarded damages, D.E. contends 
that he had no reason to file an administrative appeal.  Even 
still, D.E. points out that it was not until after the applicable 
timeframe for an appeal had passed that he truly became an 
aggrieved party as a result of Central Dauphin's refusal to 
work with him and his parents regarding his award.  D.E. 
further argues that the District Court misconstrued his 
specific request for relief.  He contends that his claim merely 
seeks an equitable remedy that will guarantee him the 
services to which he is entitled and which neither he nor his 
parents can otherwise afford; not, as the District Court 
concluded, an attempt to rewrite the hearing officer's award.  
D.E. notes that to base the availability of a remedy under the 
IDEA on whether a student or his parents are able to front the 
costs of such remedies is inconsistent with public policy 
principles underlying the IDEA.       
Central Dauphin argues, in contrast, that we should 
affirm the District Court's dismissal of D.E.'s IDEA claims in 
their entirety.  According to Central Dauphin, the plain 
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language of the hearing officer's decision and order gave D.E. 
and his parents the responsibility to determine and initiate 
compensatory education services, and made Central Dauphin 
responsible for only reimbursements of any such services 
once attained.  Central Dauphin asserts that D.E. was fully 
aware of the foregoing and still failed to appeal the decision 
despite his alleged inability to front the costs for the services.  
Central Dauphin further notes that the exhaustion requirement 
may be set aside only in certain circumstances and that D.E. 
failed to argue that any of those exceptions apply to his case.  
For that reason, Central Dauphin also contends that D.E.'s 
argument has been waived for failure to preserve it before the 
District Court.  Finally, in further support of its position, 
Central Dauphin asserts that, to the extent that D.E. seeks to 
enforce or rewrite the hearing officer's decision, the federal 
courts have no jurisdiction. 
(1) 
In order to resolve the issues presented by the parties, 
we must first address the District Court's conclusion that D.E. 
sought to rewrite, rather than enforce, the administrative 
decision.  The District Court concluded that "the plain 
language of the order gives the parents the responsibility of 
determining and initiating the compensatory education 
services and makes [Central Dauphin] responsible for paying 
for those services at face value once they have been attained."  
D.E. v. Cent. Dauphin Sch. Dist., No. 1:06-CV-2423, 2009 
WL 904960, at *5 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 31, 2009).  Based upon that 
interpretation of the hearing officer's award, the District Court 
concluded that there was no evidence to support D.E.'s 
contention that the order needed enforcement or that Central 
Dauphin had failed to compensate them for services for which 
they had previously paid.  We disagree with that conclusion.  
While it is true that the hearing officer's award contemplates 
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reimbursement for services paid for by D.E.'s parents, it also 
states that, "[s]hould the parties agree, [Central Dauphin] may 
set up a fund with a set dollar amount that the parent may 
draw upon for educational services and equipment."  App. at 
171.  The inclusion of this language within the award 
demonstrates that the hearing officer clearly envisioned the 
method of payment that D.E. seeks to obtain here.  Of course, 
the parties must agree to set up the fund, but it remains true 
that the hearing officer's award did contemplate such a 
remedy.
11
   
The inclusion of the fund language in the hearing 
officer's award also demonstrates that Central Dauphin and 
D.E.'s parents were to work together for the benefit of D.E. 
going forward.  Indeed, it is more likely that the hearing 
officer intended that the parties work together to create the 
fund that D.E. seeks, than to give Central Dauphin an option 
to not agree to set up a fund.  The District Court and Central 
Dauphin ignore this point, and instead base their conclusions 
largely on the portion of the order that calls for 
reimbursement.  This interpretation, however, which places 
all of the responsibility on D.E. and his parents to remedy 
Central Dauphin's failures under the IDEA, is contrary to the 
very purpose of the statute, which is to provide a remedy for 
those denied a FAPE.  See D.F. v. Collingswood Borough Bd. 
                                              
11
 The sentence preceding the aforementioned 
language states that "[t]he hours are not to be used for college 
tuition, unless the parties both agree."  One could argue that 
the next sentence, the sentence at issue, only applies to the 
ability to set up a fund for purposes of college tuition.  
However, given the nature of the award (completely favorable 
to D.E.), a fund is something that was likely envisioned as a 
remedy for Central Dauphin's violations.   
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of Educ., 694 F.3d 488, 497 (3d Cir. 2012) ("To comply with 
the IDEA, a school district no longer responsible for 
educating a child must still be held responsible for its past 
transgressions.  Were we to uphold the District Court's ruling, 
we would create an enormous loophole in that obligation and 
thereby substantially weaken the IDEA's protections.").  D.E. 
specifically alleges that he is being denied this remedy, as 
Central Dauphin is unwilling to cooperate with him to create 
the fund envisioned by the hearing officer.  This allegation is 
certainly reinforced by Central Dauphin's interpretation of the 
award – that it was only required to reimburse for services 
already attained by the student and his parents.   
The gravamen of D.E.'s complaint is that he cannot 
afford to front the costs of the services that Central Dauphin 
was obligated to have provided him for free under the IDEA, 
and which they failed to do.  Our Court, as well as several 
others, has recognized that the availability of IDEA remedies 
should not depend upon whether a student or his parents have 
the financial means to front the costs of those remedies.  See, 
e.g., id. at 498 (holding that a claim for compensatory 
education is not rendered moot by an out-of-district move, 
even if that move takes the child out of state because, to hold 
otherwise, would particularly impact low-income special 
needs students); Reid v. District of Columbia, 401 F.3d 516, 
522-23 (D.C. Cir. 2005) ("[W]ere it impossible to obtain an 
award of the [compensatory] instruction itself, children's 
access to appropriate education could depend on their parents' 
capacity to front its costs – a result manifestly incompatible 
with IDEA's purpose of ensuring that all children with 
disabilities have available to them a [FAPE]." (internal 
quotation marks omitted)); Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 
865, 873 (3d Cir. 1990) ("[W]e conclude that Congress, by 
allowing the courts to fashion an appropriate remedy to cure 
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the deprivation of a child's right to a [FAPE], did not intend 
to offer a remedy only to those parents able to afford an 
alternative private education."); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 
749, 753 (8th Cir. 1986) ("We cannot agree with the 
defendants that they should escape liability for these services 
simply because [plaintiff] was unable to provide them in the 
first instance; . . . We are confident that Congress did not 
intend the child's entitlement to a free education to turn upon 
her parent's ability to 'front' its costs.").  The District Court, in 
adopting and applying Central Dauphin's interpretation of the 
hearing officer's award, made D.E.'s access to a FAPE 
dependent upon his family's ability to front the costs of his 
compensatory education award.    
In sum, the District Court had within its power to 
formulate an appropriate remedy that would effectuate the 
purpose of the IDEA and the hearing officer's award.  Instead, 
the District Court interpreted the hearing officer's award in a 
manner inconsistent with public policy principles underlying 
the IDEA, and effectively provided Central Dauphin a way to 
escape liability for its past IDEA violations by refusing to 
"agree" with D.E. and his family to set up a fund for purposes 
of obtaining the educational services to which he was clearly 
entitled.  We cannot uphold such an interpretation, as doing 
so would "create an enormous loophole" in a school district's 
obligations under the IDEA, while "substantially weaken[ing] 
the IDEA's protections" for students in D.E.'s position.  D.F., 
694 F.3d at 497.  We therefore conclude that the District 
Court erred in finding that D.E.'s claims sought to rewrite, 
rather than enforce, the administrative decision. 
(2) 
Since we have concluded that D.E. did indeed seek to 
enforce the hearing officer's order, we must resolve a question 
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of first impression, that is, whether a party seeking to enforce 
a favorable decision from an administrative due process 
hearing must exhaust administrative remedies before filing 
suit in a court of law.   
The IDEA "is a Spending Clause statute that seeks to 
ensure that all children with disabilities have available to 
them a [FAPE]."  Schaffer v. Weast, 546 U.S. 49, 51 (2005) 
(internal quotation mark omitted).  The statute "'leaves to the 
States the primary responsibility for developing and executing 
educational programs for handicapped children, [but] imposes 
significant requirements to be followed in the discharge of 
that responsibility.'"  Id. at 52 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Bd. of Ed. of Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 
458 U.S. 176, 183 (1982)).  "The core of the statute, however, 
is the cooperative process that it establishes between parents 
and schools."  Id. at 53.  The statute places significant 
emphasis on a parent's involvement in the disabled child's 
education, and requires the school to maintain contact with 
the parents throughout the entire process.  Id.  If a parent is 
displeased with the school's actions with respect to the FAPE 
provision, the IDEA provides for certain procedural 
safeguards available to children with disabilities and their 
parents.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(a).   
One such procedural safeguard is the right of those 
aggrieved by violations of the IDEA to a due process hearing 
before an administrative official.  See id. at § 1415(b); see 
also S.H., 729 F.3d at 257 (noting that a child or a parent who 
claims violations of the IDEA can file a complaint with a due 
process hearing officer).  "[A]ny party aggrieved by the 
findings and decision rendered [by the administrative official] 
may appeal such findings and decision to the State 
educational agency."  20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1).  At the final 
stage of the aforementioned enforcement procedure, the 
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IDEA permits any aggrieved party to bring a civil action in 
state or federal court.  Jeremy H. v. Mount Lebanon Sch. 
Dist., 95 F.3d 272, 275 (3d Cir. 1996); see also 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2).  There, the court will "review[] the records of the 
administrative proceedings, hear[] additional evidence at the 
request of [either party], and grant[] . . . relief as may be 
appropriate."  Komninos v. Upper Saddle River Bd. of Educ., 
13 F.3d 775, 778 (3d Cir. 1994); see also 20 U.S.C. § 
1415(i)(2)(C).       
As noted above, the IDEA grants subject matter 
jurisdiction to the federal district courts.  See Komninos, 13 
F.3d at 778.  The language of the IDEA makes clear, 
however, "that Congress intended plaintiffs to complete the 
administrative process before resorting to federal court."  Id.  
This includes the process detailed above, participation in a 
due process hearing and, where appropriate, an appeal to the 
state educational agency.  20 U.S.C. § 1415(g)(1).  The 
Supreme Court has noted as much regarding administrative 
exhaustion under the IDEA: 
[A]llowing an equal protection 
claim without requiring 
exhaustion under the predecessor 
statute, would not only "render 
superfluous most of the detailed 
procedural protections outlined in 
the statute, but, more important, it 
would also run counter to 
Congress' view that the needs of 
handicapped children are best 
accommodated by having the 
parents and the local education 
agency work together to formulate 
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an individualized plan for each 
handicapped child's education."   
 
Komninos, 13 F.3d at 778 (quoting Smith v. Robinson, 468 
U.S. 992, 1011-12 (1984)).  It follows, then, that in order to 
give effect to these important purposes, courts must enforce 
the rules of exhaustion.  It bears noting, however, that there 
are four exceptions where exhaustion would be unnecessary.  
Those recognized by this Court include situations where: (1) 
exhaustion would be futile or inadequate; (2) the issue 
presented is purely a legal question; (3) the administrative 
agency cannot grant relief; and (4) exhaustion would cause 
severe or irreparable harm.  Id.  Absent the existence of any 
of those exceptions, failure to exhaust will deprive a federal 
court of subject matter jurisdiction.     
 Here, neither party disputes that D.E. failed to appeal 
the hearing officer's findings and decision.  However, D.E. 
contends that there was no need to appeal since he won at his 
due process hearing in all regards.  According to D.E., once a 
party receives a completely favorable administrative decision, 
there is nothing left to appeal administratively.  We agree.  
Two cases from the Fourth and Ninth Circuit Courts of 
Appeals provide support for this conclusion.  See Porter v. 
Bd. of Trs. of Manhattan Beach Unified Sch. Dist., 307 F.3d 
1064 (9th Cir. 2002); Robinson v. Pinderhughes, 810 F.2d 
1270 (4th Cir. 1987).   
 In Porter, for example, parents of an autistic public-
school student brought an action against the school district 
under the IDEA and § 1983, alleging failure to comply with 
an administrative order of compensatory education for the 
student.  Id. at 1068.  The district court dismissed the parents' 
complaint for want of jurisdiction, ruling that the parents 
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were required to exhaust California's complaint resolution 
process ("CRP"), a procedure distinct from the IDEA's due 
process requirements, before filing suit in court.  Id. at 1066.  
The Ninth Circuit disagreed, holding that: (1) further 
exhaustion of California's due process procedures enacted to 
comply with § 1415 of the IDEA would be futile, and (2) the 
parents were not required to exhaust California's CRP.  Id.  In 
so holding, the Ninth Circuit reasoned that "[o]nce a due 
process hearing issues an order that is not appealed by either 
party, the IDEA requires that the order be treated as 'final.'"  
Id. at 1071 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A)).  The Court 
concluded that the "clear congressional demarcation [in § 
1415] of an end point to the due process procedures" 
supported its position that "[n]o other administrative 
procedures [were] required to be exhausted."  Id.   
 While Porter is slightly distinguishable from the 
instant matter in that California's IDEA due process 
procedure is "one-tier,"
 12
 the case raises an interesting point 
regarding finality in the statutory language.  The language 
clearly states that any decision made at an impartial due 
process hearing "shall be final," except where a party appeals 
the decision.  See 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(1)(A).  In situations 
where neither party appeals, that administrative decision 
                                              
12
 California's hearing system is known as a "one-tier" 
system because the initial hearing is conducted by the state 
education agency.  When D.E. initiated his due process 
hearing, Pennsylvania operated under a "two-tier" hearing 
system, in which the initial hearing was conducted by the 
local education agency, the decision of which either party 
could appeal to the state education agency.  See 20 U.S.C. § 
1415.  Pennsylvania has since moved to a one-tier system.  
See 38 Pa. Bull. 3575.       
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becomes "final and binding under the IDEA" and, as a result, 
nothing is left to be exhausted administratively.  Porter, 307 
F.3d at 1069.  The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals has stated 
the same: 
[T]he plaintiffs in our opinion 
have received a final 
administrative decision under the 
[IDEA].  The [IDEA] provides 
that "any party aggrieved by the 
findings and decision" of a local 
hearing officer may appeal to the 
state educational agency.  A 
hearing decision that is not 
appealed is final.  Contrary to the 
district court's holding, the 
plaintiffs had neither the 
responsibility nor the right to 
appeal the favorable decision by 
the local hearing officer since 
they were not aggrieved by his 
decision.  They had exhausted all 
administrative remedies available 
to them under the [IDEA].  When 
the city did not appeal the local 
decision, it became the final 
administrative decision of the 
State. 
 
Robinson, 810 F.2d at 1272 (citations omitted).   
As Porter and Robinson make clear, administrative 
exhaustion of a favorable decision is futile and barred by the 
express language of the statute in that only "aggrieved 
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parties" may appeal.  For those reasons, we now hold that a 
party seeking to enforce a favorable decision from an 
administrative due process hearing need not exhaust 
administrative remedies before filing suit in a court of law.   
As relevant to the instant case, D.E. received a 
favorable decision at the administrative level, and neither 
party sought an appeal thereafter, rendering the hearing 
officer's decision "final and binding under the IDEA."  
Porter, 307 F.3d at 1069.  For D.E., the favorable decision 
left him with nothing to appeal.  He had, therefore, exhausted 
his remedies as far as the administrative process was 
concerned.  It was error for the District Court to dismiss 
D.E.'s IDEA claim for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies.
13
   
(3) 
 The fact that D.E. was not an "aggrieved party" for 
purposes of administrative exhaustion raises the question of 
whether his claim can properly be pursued under the IDEA.  
                                              
13
 Central Dauphin argues that D.E. waived any 
argument regarding administrative exhaustion because he 
failed to argue that any of the exceptions to exhaustion apply 
to his case before the District Court.  Given our conclusion 
here, that argument is meritless.  Even if we were to consider 
Central Dauphin's claim of waiver, D.E.'s argument, even 
before the District Court, has always been that he had no 
reason to appeal from the hearing officer's decision because 
he won on all accounts.  See Brief in Opposition at 12, D.E. v. 
Central Dauphin Sch. Dist., No. 1:06-cv-02423-LFS, (M.D. 
Pa. May 7, 2008), ECF No. 29 ("Contrary to the contorted 
logic of the Defendants, Plaintiffs had nothing to appeal.").  
This is, essentially, an argument in futility.  
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Section 1415(i)(2) provides for a right of "[a]ny party 
aggrieved by the findings and decision" of the administrative 
proceedings to bring a civil action in state or federal court.  20 
U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2) (emphasis added).  This language 
necessarily implicates a jurisdictional issue for both this 
Court and the District Court, as D.E. received a favorable 
decision at the administrative level.  We must now determine 
whether an individual who seeks to enforce a favorable 
administrative decision in court is an "aggrieved party" for 
purposes of § 1415(i)(2).         
 We explicitly left that question open in Jeremy H.  See 
95 F.3d at 278.  There, the plaintiffs' complaint sought, 
among other things, to enforce elements of the state 
administrative decision.  Id.  We acknowledged that "there 
may be some question whether this aspect of the complaint 
[could] properly be pursued under [the IDEA]."  Id.  We 
ultimately found it unnecessary to resolve the question in the 
context of the case, but set forth the competing arguments in a 
footnote: 
The argument against the 
applicability of [§ 1415(i)(2)] 
would be that the [plaintiffs], in 
seeking judicial assistance to 
enforce portions of the IDEA 
administrative decision, were not 
persons "aggrieved by the 
findings and decision" within the 
meaning of [§ 1415(i)(2)], but 
rather persons aggrieved by the 
failure of the local school officials 
to implement the decision.  The 
counter-argument would be that 
the [plaintiffs] were "aggrieved" 
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by the fact that the administrative 
orders favorable to the Hunters 
contained no enforcement 
mechanisms. 
 
Id. at 278 n.10.     
 Since the Jeremy H. decision, only the Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit has definitively decided the 
question at issue, adopting reasoning similar to the latter 
argument noted in Jeremy H.  See Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto 
Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 116 (1st Cir. 2003) (concluding that a 
disabled student and his parents qualified as "parties 
aggrieved" under the IDEA, even though they prevailed at 
their administrative hearing, where the school district neither 
appealed nor complied with its continuing obligations under 
the administrative order).  There, the First Circuit focused 
largely upon Congress's intent, noting that "Congress could 
not have intended to leave plaintiffs without an IDEA 
statutory remedy when they succeed before the hearing 
officer and the school system does not appeal the 
administrative decision but simply fails to fulfill a continuing 
obligation to provide services."  Nieves-Marquez, 353 F.3d at 
116.  The Court went on to state that, "[i]t cannot be that a 
court is powerless under IDEA to issue injunctive relief" 
given the same facts.  Id.  To do so, the Court concluded, 
"would open a gaping hole in IDEA's coverage" and "would 
create incentives for school systems to drag out the 
administrative process, not to appeal administrative orders, 
not to announce their intentions to refuse to comply with 
those orders, and generally not to comply."  Id.   
 The Ninth and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
reached similar conclusions in similar contexts.  See Porter, 
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307 F.3d at 1069-70 ("It is also clear that it would be futile to 
bring a complaint to the [hearing officer] alleging the failure 
to implement a due process hearing order . . . . Thus, we 
conclude that the [plaintiffs'] complaint alleges a violation of 
the IDEA for which further exhaustion . . . would be futile . . . 
, allowing them to bring their claim directly to court."); Miller 
v. Bd. of Educ. of Albuquerque Pub. Schs., 565 F.3d 1232, 
1243 (10th Cir. 2009) (adopting the conclusion in Nieves-
Marquez to conclude that a preemptive challenge on a 
speculative theory of noncompliance by the school district 
was inappropriate because the plaintiff could return to court 
to enforce the award from the administrative proceedings).   
 Finally, Dudley v. Lower Merion School District, 768 
F. Supp. 2d 779 (E.D. Pa. 2011), a case from the Eastern 
District of Pennsylvania, also sets forth a particularly 
persuasive argument in favor of jurisdiction over IDEA 
claims of enforcement.  There, as in the instant case, the 
plaintiffs sought an order compelling the school district to 
implement certain aspects of the hearing officer's order which 
were favorable to them.  Id. at 782.  The school district 
argued that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction 
under the IDEA.  Id.  The district court rejected the school 
district's argument, concluding that the plaintiffs were 
"aggrieved" for purposes of the IDEA and could bring their 
claim of enforcement to court.  Id. at 783.  In so holding, the 
court noted that: 
The IDEA is a 
comprehensive remedial scheme 
which is intended to provide a 
judicial remedy for violations of 
any right relating to the 
identification, evaluation, or 
educational placement of [a] 
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child, or the provision of a 
[FAPE] to such child.  
. . . . 
It would be anomalous 
indeed to read the IDEA as 
omitting a judicial remedy where 
a party is successful before a 
hearing officer but the School 
District refuses to carry out the 
decision.  That party is as much 
aggrieved as in the circumstances 
where the administrative ruling is 
adverse.  In both cases, the relief 
sought has not been realized.  
 
Id. (first alteration in original) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  
 Both Dudley and Nieves-Marquez focus largely upon 
the lack of an enforcement mechanism in the IDEA for 
parties who prevail at the administrative level, but are later 
faced with a noncompliant school district.  We believe that 
the circumstances here, especially in light of the IDEA's 
purpose, warrant the same conclusion.  We therefore hold that 
individuals seeking to enforce a favorable decision obtained 
at the administrative level are "aggrieved" for purposes of the 
IDEA and may properly pursue such claims in court.  The 
District Court's dismissal of D.E.'s IDEA claims for failure to 
exhaust administrative remedies must be reversed. 
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court as to D.E.'s ADA and RA claims, 
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but will reverse its order as to D.E.'s IDEA claim.  In 
considering D.E.'s IDEA claim, "we encourage the District 
Court to consider any form of compensatory education 
proposed" in a manner consistent with the IDEA and Third 
Circuit precedent.  See D.F., 694 F.3d at 498-99 (setting forth 
a non-exhaustive list of potential forms of compensatory 
education awards).     
